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The contribution of UK asylum policy 1999-2010 to conditions for the exploitation of 
migrant labour 
Tom Vickers 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses UK asylum policies since 1999 in the context of wider neoliberal 
approaches to migration, which present labour market demand and personal wealth as the 
dominant criteria for mobility. It considers refugee claims as an implicit challenge to these 
criteria because they are universal and needs-based. It argues that dispersal, prohibition of 
paid work and detention of asylum seekers have countered this challenge and thereby 
reinforced labour market discipline over migrants. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that our understanding of UK asylum policies can be deepened through a 
political economy analysis. The chapter focuses on the period 1999-2010, drawing on 
research conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne between 2007 and 2010 (also see Vickers 2012; 
2014a; 2014b).i Policy changes directed at asylum seekersii during this period included forced 
dispersal from 1999, prohibition of paid work from 2002, and a significant increase in 
immigration detention. These policies, alongside the detained fast track system and 
reductions in access to appeals and legal aid, amount to an increasingly punitive system that 
has been widely criticised by bodies such as the Independent Asylum Commission (IAC 
2008b), and has provoked widespread resistance from those within the system and their 
supporters (Anti-Raids Network 2014; Gill et al 2012; Vickers 2014a), yet the overall policy 
direction has continued. This suggests there may be even more powerful pressures pushing 
for a continuation of the current direction.  
 Explanations of the hostile policy climate that focus exclusively on the influence of 
the media, or voter attitudes, do not explain why these policies have been enacted at this 
particular time. Indeed, Philo et al (2013) argue that British governments have actively used 
the media to cultivate public hostility toward refugees. An explanation is also needed for the 
consistency in policy direction across different political parties in power, including the 
Labour Party between 1997 and 2010 and the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties in 
coalition since 2010, and for the focus on asylum seekers, out of all proportion to their 
numbers relative to other forms of migration (Cohen 2006: 5–6; Crawley 2006: 22–4). If we 
consider the distinctive characteristic of asylum to be the claim to citizenship based solely on 
the needs of a group or individual, then a political economy approach directs attention to 
some powerful reasons for Britain's capitalist class to restrict asylum during this period: 
 The increasing push since the 1970s to further commodify labour power as part of a 
neoliberaliii policy approach (Lavalette and Pratt 2006), requiring the elimination of 
claims based on human needs rather than market forces; 
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 The destruction of the socialist bloc at the end of the 1980s, which both removed the 
political value of granting asylum to 'dissidents' in order to embarrass their socialist 
countries of origin (Schuster 2003), and made available a large pool of highly skilled 
labour in nearby Eastern Europe, who were under economic pressures to migrate 
(Hardy 2008). 
In the context of a policy approach of 'managed migration', with rights to move to Britain 
increasingly tailored to the labour needs of capital, asylum represented an exception, with 
claims based on universal human rights. Even where refugees' labour is needed within 
Britain, the fact that refugees move regardless of whether their labour is needed or not 
represents a threat to the dominance of neo-liberal criteria. Restrictions on access to asylum 
between 1999 and 2010 helped counter this threat. Table 1 shows the general decline in 
numbers of applications between 1999 and 2010, while refusal rates have remained high, 
exceeding 80% for three consecutive years and exceeding 70% in nine out of twelve years.  
 
Table 1: Asylum applications and refusals rates 1999-2010 
Year Asylum 
applications* 
Refusal Rate** 
1999 71,160 52% 
2000 80,315 74% 
2001 71,025 72% 
2002 84,130 63% 
2003 49,405 83% 
2004 33,960 88% 
2005 25,710 83% 
2006 23,610 78% 
2007 23,430 73% 
2008 25,930 69% 
2009 24,485 72% 
2010 17,790 75% 
* Includes applications made at the port of entry and after arrival in the UK 
** Final decisions made that year, including applications which may have been made in a 
previous year. 
Figures from UK Home Office Immigration Statistics 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics) 
 
In October 2013 The Observer reported statements by a Home Office spokesperson that 
officials dealing with asylum cases were expected to secure a rejection in at least 60% of 
This is the author’s accepted version of the following chapter: Vickers, T. (2015) 'The contribution of UK asylum 
policy 1999–2010 to conditions for the exploitation of migrant labour', in L. Waite, G. Craig, H. Lewis and K. 
Skrivankova (eds), Vulnerability, exploitation and migrants: Insecure work in a globalised economy, London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, pp 101-14. The version of record is available at: 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137460417_8  
 
3 
 
cases (Taylor 2013), and in January 2014 The Guardian cited written Home Office guidelines 
offering rewards to officials meeting a 70% rejection target (Taylor and Mason 2014). These 
restrictions on access to asylum contributed to conditions for more intense exploitation of 
other migrants' labour, by making it more difficult in practice to assert economic, political 
and social rights. The creation of a separate welfare and housing system for asylum seekers in 
1999, the prohibition of paid work in 2002, and the increasing use of immigration detention, 
all served to make it harder for refugees to build links with non-refugees. This both made it 
more difficult for refugees to resist the injustices of the asylum system, and countered the 
potential for refugees from oppressed countries to form alliances with British working class 
people, by removing opportunities for day to day contact and struggle – over shared 
conditions of housing and work, for example - which could threaten international divisions of 
labour. 
 The remainder of this chapter sketches some key features of the political economy 
approach that informs this analysis, before discussing the role of migrant labour in the British 
economy and the implications of specific asylum policies. 
 
British Capitalism and the International Reserve Army of Labour   
This chapter employs an analysis of contemporary capitalism that draws on Lenin's ([1916] 
1975) theory of imperialism. Imperialism is understood here as a phase of capitalism 
characterised by the merger of banking and manufacturing capital into monopoly finance 
capital, and the division of the world into countries with a high concentration of capital 
ownership and consequently financial, political and military power, and countries with low 
levels of capital ownership, whose people and resources are exploited for the benefit of the 
owners of capital. Based on their relative positions within the international capitalist system, 
the former countries are characterised as imperialist countries, and the latter as oppressed 
countries, while recognising that there is a dynamic continuum between the two categories, 
with continuous struggles for imperialist countries to maintain and extend their dominance 
relative to their rivals, for less powerful capitalist countries to aspire to imperialist status, and 
for oppressed countries to mitigate or overturn their oppression. Struggles of oppression and 
resistance exist within oppressed and imperialist countries, as well as between them, and 
these are shaped by, and shape, the position of these countries within the imperialist system. 
The chapter employs an analysis of the state drawing on Lenin ([1917] 1972), as a set of 
interlocking institutions ultimately serving the interests of the British capitalist class (outlined 
in more detail in Vickers 2014b). 
 Countries’ position within capitalism has emerged historically, driven by the internal 
dynamic of the capital accumulation process. Accumulation of capital produces a tendency 
for the rate of profit to fall (Marx [1894] 2006); eventually an over-accumulation of capital 
results in insufficient opportunities for investment relative to the mass of accumulated capital, 
and the accumulation process fails (Grossman [1929] 1992). One of the consequences of this 
process is that as capital accumulates in the main capitalist centres – the imperialist countries 
– there is a drive to export capital abroad, to countries with lower concentrations of capital 
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and where conditions can be created for a higher rate of profit, maintaining the average rate 
of profit as an incentive for continued investment. An international division of labour is an 
integral part of the division of countries into imperialist and oppressed categories (see also 
Smith’s chapter in this collection). Profitable conditions in oppressed countries often include 
lower health and safety and environmental standards, lower pay and a lower 'social wage' in 
the form of state services and financial support. In 2011, Britain earned a rate of return on 
investments in Asia and the rest of the world, excluding the EU and US, of 3.3 per cent and 
3.0 per cent respectively, compared to 2.5 per cent return on other countries' investments in 
the UK (ONS 2013a: 17), a significant difference considering the sums involved. At the end 
of 2012 Britain's total external assets stood at £10,222.9 billion (ONS 2013b: 6), more than 
6.5 times UK GDP. For Foreign Direct Investment, which accounts for around 10 per cent of 
the UK's total overseas assets, the UK received rates of return of 19 per cent and 16 per cent 
respectively for investments in Africa and Asia, compared to a rate of return of 4 per cent on 
direct investments into the UK (ONS 2013c): this represents a parasitic relationship and 
conditions of super-exploitation in oppressed countries. Material underdevelopment of 
countries oppressed within imperialism has historically prevented these countries’ domestic 
production from fulfilling their own populations’ needs, thus simultaneously generating 
markets for imperialist exports, and maintaining a reserve army of labour for imperialist 
countries (Castells [1975] 2002; Miles 1987; Chinweizu and Jameson 2008).  
 As Castells ([1975] 2002: 85) argues, the relationship between capital, labour and 
mobility is not simply economic, but is mediated by political systems and relationships that 
arise from the economic base and impact back upon it. Control over one's mobility is rooted 
in a person's relationship to capital, both in terms of where their country of citizenship stands 
within imperialism, and their class position within that country. As Foster et al (2011: 6) 
point out, the production of super-profits in oppressed countries through conditions that can 
be characterised as super-exploitation, depends on the immobility of labour. While capital is 
free to move across borders, the movement of workers from oppressed countries is therefore 
heavily regulated (Barber and Lem 2008: 4).  
 
The ‘New Migration’ from Eastern and Central Europe 
2004 saw a significant development in freedom of movement and employment for citizens 
designated ‘migrant workers’ from the ‘Accession 8’ (A8) countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe, with the further addition of the ‘A2’ countries, Romania and Bulgaria, in 2007. Datta 
et al. (2007) suggest A8 workers may have been a preferred source of labour compared to 
migrants from outside the EU, both for their ‘whiteness’ and on the understanding that they 
would be more likely to return to their country of origin than people who have travelled 
greater distances (Datta et al 2007: 49). By 2007, there were an estimated 1.4 million 
registered migrant workers in the UK, around half of whom had arrived from the A8 and A2 
countries since 2004, and somewhere between 300,000 and 800,000 unregistered migrant 
workers (Craig et al 2007: 22). Even for those who were registered, many worked in 
conditions so exploitative as to meet the international definition of ‘forced labour’ (Geddes et 
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al 2013; Ahmad 2008: 857). The Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) was established, in 
the words of the Home Office, to provide ‘transitional measures to regulate A8 nationals’ 
access to the labour market … and to restrict access to benefits.’ Access to the labour market 
was regulated by the requirement to register for the WRS, but this did not apply to those 
classified as 'self-employed'. Those designating themselves self-employed were thereby 
denied many employment rights, even where they were dependent on a single employer for 
work (Dwyer et al 2011).  While on the WRS, migrants had severely restricted access to 
unemployment, child and housing benefits. In the first quarter of 2010, 71 per cent of 
requests by A8 workers for tax-funded, income-related benefits were refused (Home Office 
2010: 23–4). This gave these workers a distinct relationship to capital, to the benefit of the 
capitalist class. It further explains their preference for Eastern European workers over 
refugees, who, once they were granted refugee status, had far greater rights to remain in 
Britain and access state support (Chinweizu 2006), although these rights have been reduced 
by the shift from indefinite leave to remain to an initial five years. Under the WRS A8 
migrants only had access to out-of-work benefits once they had completed 12 months in 
continuous employment. The WRS ended in 2011 and the restrictions on A2 migrants ended 
in 2014, but were replaced by regulations restricting access to benefits for all EU migrant 
workers, extending the exploitative conditions previously affecting A8 and A2 migrants to 
also include the growing numbers of migrants fleeing the results of crisis and austerity in 
Southern Europe. 
 
Refugees in Britain and the Management of Migration 
Refugees occupy an ambiguous position in the international division of labour, seeking 
refuge on the basis of universal human rights yet also available to be called on for their 
labour, depending on the needs of capital (Kay and Miles 1992: 4–7).  To the extent that 
refugees ‘put down roots’ in Britain and gain access to resources and networks of support, 
they are in a stronger position to resist the demands of capital and assert greater control over 
their mobility, based on their own needs and priorities. Refugees have faced significant 
barriers to integration for a long time (Bloch 2002) and continue to do so (Carnet et al 2014). 
The ability to put down roots and rebuild their lives in Britain was increasingly obstructed 
from 1999 by key policy interventions targeted at refugees without status, designated 'asylum 
seekers'. While the increased use of detention (Silverman 2011) also has significance within 
these processes of social control (Gill 2009), this chapter will focus on dispersal and the 
prohibition on paid work, due to their role in isolating refugees within community settings, 
where it might be expected that there would be more opportunities for integration compared 
to detention. It draws on qualitative research conducted in Newcastle between 2007 and 
2010, which included multiple in-depth qualitative interviews and focus groups with eighteen 
refugees, some with status and some without, supplemented by interviews with the staff of 
four voluntary and community sector organisations.  
Under the dispersal system, Temple et al. (2005) found asylum seekers’ attempts to 
reconstitute communities were restricted by: allocations of resources, which tended to 
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exclude refugees without status from integration initiatives; hostile environments in dispersal 
areas, which in some cases kept people confined to their homes; and prohibition of paid work 
(Temple et al 2005: 23–6). These factors were also identified in research I conducted in 
Newcastle between 2007 and 2010, framed and given added force by the asylum decision-
making process itself. Overall, the refugees I interviewed presented experiences of the UK 
asylum process as unreasonable, unclear and unjust. One way of interpreting this is that a fog 
of complexity and bureaucracy covers up for the fact that a formally ‘fair’ process is in 
practice set up to fail all but a few (Tyler 2010), regardless of their need (BID 2009). Access 
to a fair consideration of cases has been undermined by reductions to legal aid and the right 
of appeal (IAC 2008b) and an approach to refugees’ claims that the Independent Asylum 
Commission termed a ‘culture of disbelief’ (IAC 2008a), echoing the findings of the earlier 
Glidewell Panel in 1996. The political economy approach outlined above suggests this may 
be a functional arrangement for capitalism, fulfilling two related but contradictory needs of 
imperialism. On the one hand, the absolute priority accorded to capital’s demand for labour 
as the basis for migrants to live in Britain is reinforced by the likelihood of being refused 
asylum, necessary for the continuation of the imperialist division of labour. On the other 
hand, the British state’s image as an upholder of universal human rights and liberty is 
maintained by the formal fairness of the system, which is necessary for the claims to moral 
authority so often used to justify Britain's imperialist interference and domination in other 
countries.  
 
Dispersal 
Since 1999 ‘dispersal’ – the forced resettlement of refugees without status to towns and cities 
across the UK – has been a key element in the British state’s attempts to manage refugees.  
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 transferred coordination of housing from local 
authorities to the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), operating under the direction of 
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND).  
In selecting areas for dispersal, little consideration was given to social and economic 
infrastructure or existing community networks or resources (Griffiths et al 2005: 41–2), and 
the main priority in selecting areas was the availability of cheap housing. In many cases 
refugees were dispersed to largely white areas with high levels of deprivation, which were 
given no preparation for the new arrivals (Hewitt 2002; Hynes 2011). Racism played a 
central role in isolating refugees’ experiences from the consciousness of British workers 
(Temple and Moran 2005). Refugees’ lack of control over where they are dispersed 
contributed to particular problems of isolation for some refugees, such as women refugees 
experiencing domestic violence (Chantler 2010: 96–7). Refugees dispersed to Newcastle 
from 1999 encountered considerable hostility, as well as solidarity. An article in the local 
Evening Chronicle is symptomatic of the hostile reception, titled ‘Police hunt four illegal 
immigrants: Asylum seekers go on the run’, referring to four men who had come from 
Holland in the back of a lorry and then run away from the driver (Hickman 2002). While 
dispersal disrupted existing networks and was carried out in a way that generated hostility 
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from some in the areas where asylum-seekers were dispersed, it also led to new forms of 
resistance (Webber 2012), including alliances between refugees and non-refugees (Vickers 
2014a).   
A political economy approach can help us to understand the dispersal system as part of 
a system for managing oppression, in the context of refugees' particular class position in the 
international capitalist system. Capital has little interest in most refugees remaining in 
Britain, because they are driven by imperatives that override demand for their labour, and 
consequently the state has little interest in providing any but the most basic means of 
survival. The existence of coherent and self-conscious diasporas with a sense of shared 
identity between immigrants in imperialist countries and their oppressed countries of origin, 
rather than with the national ruling classes of their new home, poses a threat to national 
borders on both an ideological and practical level (Gilroy 2001: 124). Major dispersal areas 
included cities with little history of migration from refugees’ countries of origin. The 
dispersal process thus played a significant political role in breaking up diasporic networks, 
removing their potential as a basis for resistance, or even a degree of independence from the 
state. The state has even less interest in helping refugees integrate with other working class 
people. Such integration could both offer solidarity for refugees’ attempts to remain in Britain 
and advance their rights, and fundamentally threaten the divisions among workers of different 
countries, which imperialism relies on to undermine resistance to the super-exploitation of 
oppressed countries. By disrupting connections with other refugees, support networks and 
other sections of workers, the dispersal system undermined the potential for collective 
resistance and increased pressure for refugees to accept the positions assigned them in 
international divisions of labour, concentrated disproportionately in low-paid sectors of the 
economy, often in far lower-skilled roles than those they are qualified for (Bloch 2007; 
Cebulla et al 2010; Fletcher 2011).  
 
The Prohibition on Paid Work 
While some categories of migrant workers continued to receive encouragement to come to 
Britain, most refugees without status were prohibited by law in 2002 from seeking paid 
workiv or even accessing work-based training, cutting them off from legal areas of the British 
labour market (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1721). Even prior to this, the ‘right to work’ 
had already been restricted to refugees with status and to the ‘primary claimant’ on each 
asylum application, and even then only once the person had been in Britain for at least six 
months (Dumper 2002: v). This excluded many women from paid work as ‘secondary 
claimants’ on family members’ applications, and legally enforced their role of unpaid 
domestic work in the reproduction of the labour power of family members who were 
permitted to do paid work. 
In a capitalist society, where survival and self-worth for the majority are tied to the sale 
of one’s labour power, refugees I interviewed in Newcastle spoke about the negative impact 
on their self-esteem and mental health as a result of forced inactivity due to being denied the 
right to undertake paid work. The experience of being a refugee, particularly one who has not 
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been granted some form of ‘leave to remain’, was strongly characterised by insecurity and 
dependency on the state, enforced by the prohibition on paid work:  
“… the asylum seeker is limited, he’s not allowed to work … his income is very low, 
and he doesn’t know the outcome of his decision, so any time he can be deported or 
can be accepted, so he is in limbo …” (refugee without status, arrived 2002) 
This insecurity, and the legal restrictions on many kinds of action which might have 
improved their situation, contributed to an intense sense of dependency: 
“I’ve always been independent … but now it’s as if I’m in prison … there’s nothing 
that proves that I’m an adult, I am just at home, just wait[ing] for somebody to give 
[things to me] …” (refugee without status from Cameroon, arrived 2008) 
By coming to Britain under imperatives other than those of the labour market, refugees have 
broken discipline with the reserve army of labour and have contradicted the neoliberal terms 
for international mobility. In response, asylum policies combine to disempower refugees and 
enforce their dependency on the British state and with it their responsiveness to be re-
disciplined into the reserve army. This both keeps them in an oppressed position, and 
manages this situation by enforcing compliance with the terms of their oppression. It also 
serves as an example of what happens to those who break neoliberalism's imperatives. Such 
an observation is not meant to imply the impossibility of resistance; indeed, the development 
of the structures of control described here has been influenced by the interplay between 
oppression and resistance, as the British state and those seeking to resist its oppression of 
refugees have each had to shift their tactics in response to the other (Vickers 2014a, 2014b). 
 
Conclusions 
Refugees occupy an indeterminate class position, particularly acute while their cases are 
under consideration. They are part of the international reserve army of labour, but a ‘part out 
of place’, with a potential to disrupt the normal functioning of the division of labour on a 
political as well as an economic level. Refuge from persecution represents a powerful form of 
needs-based claim, whose severity makes it harder to dismiss compared to more 'ordinary' 
claims such as access to food and shelter.v Refugees' trajectory is in most cases from 
countries oppressed on a national basis, with which they may maintain connections in 
identity, communication and transfer of resources. Regardless of their class position in their 
country of origin, their present position within Britain is most often among the poorest 
sections of the working class, in conditions that hold the potential to forge alliances across 
racialised divisions (for an example see Vickers 2014a). From 1999, government policy 
specifically mitigated against this, by breaking up existing networks based on refugees’ 
countries of origin, through dispersal, and impeding the formation of new ones based on 
common elements of class position within Britain, through a prohibition on paid work. With 
the exception of individuals who ‘escape’ the collective position of the majority, for example 
through paid employment in the refugee sector, the trajectory of most refugees after arrival in 
Britain is either: if they secure leave to remain, inclusion into a more regularised but still 
exploited section of the working class; or if they are refused asylum, destitution (British Red 
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Cross 2010, and see following chapters in this section),  highly exploitative conditions of 
employment, amounting in some cases to forced labour (Lewis et al 2014); or deportation 
back to the situations they have fled.  By undermining rights to remain in Britain and access 
resources based on human need, rather than labour market demand, this also creates 
conditions for more intense exploitation of other migrants' labour. 
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Notes 
i The implications of the global economic crisis of 2007 onwards are beyond the scope of this 
chapter, although it is important to note that while levels of labour migration dropped, the crisis did 
not remove Britain's structural dependency on migrants' labour (Sporton 2013).  
ii  A constructed category of refugees whose claims have not been accepted by the British state. 
iii  A policy approach characterized by aggressive privatization and deregulation. 
iv  From 2005 asylum seekers could apply for permission to work if they had been waiting for 12 
months for a decision on their asylum claim, although this could be granted or refused at the 
discretion of the Home Office. In 2010 further restrictions were introduced to limit the occupations 
those granted permission to work could undertake to a ‘shortage list’. 
v  Although the severity of refugee claims also has potential to produce a form of 
exceptionalism, with individual claims to asylum acknowledged while other needs-based claims 
continue to be ignored. 
